Military Resurgence in African Politics and the Drive for  Foreign Direct Investment by Adekunle, ADETILOYE, Kehinde & Metumara, DURUJI, Moses
     Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), June, 2013 
 
                                                                                                        
 Covenant University Journals 
 
Military Resurgence in African Politics and the Drive for  
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
ADETILOYE, Kehinde Adekunle 




DURUJI, Moses Metumara 
Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria. 
 
Abstract: The spate of democratic wave that blew across the continent of Africa in the 
1990s came with the hope of economic transformation and an end to the decades of 
backwardness, poverty and want. Prior to this period, democratic governance was the 
exception rather than the norm. Military high command across the continent dictated 
the pace for many decades and most times falling short of the messianic appeal that 
drew them into politics and governing with their diktat nature and abuse of human 
rights, the economies of most countries of the continent where the military juntas were 
entrenched, experienced stall and retrogression, creating contrition for grumbling by the 
weakened civil society in these countries. However, the turn in the dynamics of the 
international system following the collapse of communism and insistence of the 
continent‟s development partners on democratization, compelled many of the military 
juntas to retreat back to their barracks, thus opening the space for inflow of investments 
which is in dire need to reverberate the ailing economies. But after a brief spell of 
power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the lustre of power seem to be drawing 
some elements in the military high command to the old scenarios which resemble a 
reverse wave of democratization, thus allowing the gains of civilian advancement to be 
lost while the countries relapse. One of the expected areas of relapses with the 
resurgence of the military back in power is in capital flows into the countries for 
development purposes. The examines these issues and concludes that the resurgence of 
military rule in the West African sub-region is a set back to the development of the 
countries in the sub-region,  
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Introduction 
The transition to civilian 
administration from the military in 
most West African countries was 
neither easy nor smooth. The 
countries have been facing pressures 
of development from different 
quarters including their development 
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partners who insisted on democratic 
governance for continuous support. 
In addition, it was becoming 
anachronistic to have military or 
persons in uniform being in office 
apart from their main official duty. 
Some of the military high command 
in power changed uniform by 
transforming to civilians in power 
while some handed over to their 
civilian cronies. The spate of 
democratisation sweeping across the 
entire continent of Africa as a result 
of third wave global democratization 
process ensures that the military 
governments became obsolete by 
design. It also became a campaign 
for most of the development 
partners, knowing the obvious 
disadvantage of Military institutions 
in power the military in power to 
cause n exit of the institutions from 
directly holding  on to power in most 
African countries. On the side of 
business, most industrial nations also 
find it difficult to have contractual 
agreements military men and found 
them difficult to accommodate in the 
comity of nations where important 
issues that border on long term 
commitments are discussed. 
 
After a brief spell of power in the 
hands of the civilian authorities, the 
luctre of power seem to be drawing 
some elements in the military high 
command to the old scenarios which 
resemble a reverse wave of 
democratization, thus allowing the 
gains of civilian advancement to be 
lost while the countries relapse. One 
of the expected areas of relapses with 
the resurgence of the military back in 
power is in capital flows into the 
countries for development purposes. 
Though African countries of the 
West have not been noticed or 
recorded to be doing well in the area 
of capital inflows (UNCTAD 2010, 
2011), the conditions may worsen 
and developmental targets and the 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) not be met in these 
countries. The civilian 
administrations may have improved 
the environment somewhat, but it is 
evident the re-entry of the military 
into power cannot improve the 
situation no matter how altruistic 
their intention of man in uniform 
who seize power is (Abubakar 2008). 
Many of incursions are blamed on 
deteriorating conditions of life and 
institutions but it is not noticed that 
the military itself as an institution at 
the very least has received any 
benefit from such political 
expeditions. While capital flows into 
different sectors of the economies 
where benefits and returns can be 
reaped in accordance with the 
investors‟ horizon have been 
continuous in its little form, the fear 
that the flows may result in sudden 
stop or retrenchment or in certain 
cases expropriation of assets is 
palpable. 
 
Many of the causes and determinants 
of lack of development in a military 
government can be traced to 
governance and transparency 
problems which the developed 
countries but the Multinationals or 
Transnational Corporations (MNCs 
and TNCs) in these countries are 
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completely averse to. The basic 
objective of this paper is to examine 
the impact of  the comeback of 
military governments can have on 
capital flows or Foreign direct 
investment into these countries and 
to specifically discover if the level of 
development  and its  
momentum  can be maintained in 
spite of the loss of democratic 
governance by these countries. The 
paper is organised as follows: section 
2 deals with the review of available 
literature comes after the 
introduction. Sections 3 discuss the 
methodology, model and sources of 
data while section 4 discusses the 
results. The last section makes 
recommendations and concludes the 
paper. 
 
Review of Literature 
While the basic rule international 
investment flows in virtually every 
country has been attract FDI at all 
costs, it has been noted that it does 
not all the come with solid theorised 
benefit but with some costs as well. 
In spite of this its benefits to African 
economies cannot be 
overemphasised at this time for 
national development purposes. On 
the positive side are studies such as 
Bellak (2004) and Mayer-Foulkes 
and Nunnenkamp (2005). On the 
other side are studies of Van 
Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg 
(2001) and Akinlo (2004). Evidence 
for need of FDI has tended to the 
positive side though the negative 
side has not been controlled by these 
economies. Stehrer and Woerz 
(2005) also found strong support for 
the clamour for FDI by countries 
including emerging and developed 
countries of the world by the impacts 
it has on the productivity and output. 
Its impact on export led growth and 
wages of the economies of the 
countries they studied were quite 
significant. The paper discovers a bi-
directional causality between 
productivity and FDI inflows, but 
with inflows having little effect on 
the spurning of growth of domestic 
investment. It also is not significant 
in the pulling entrepreneurial growth 
efforts in the economies.  
 
A plethora of determinants cause the 
FDI to flow in particular ways. 
Global causes of capital flows have 
been held to the real interests in the 
United States and to a less extent the 
prices of commodities (Byrne and 
Fiess, 2011). The impact of the 
outflows on FDI is quite significant 
since the outflows impel some 
pressure on the performance of 
emerging and frontier economies and 
especially developing countries of 
Africa. Arguments have evolved on 
the push factors for FDI and 
generally revolved round about the 
Marginal PK which seems higher 
elsewhere especially in capital scarce 
countries. A large proportion of the 
profits of the MNCs are realised 
from the emerging and developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2008). Large 
companies realize 26 to 28 percent 
rate of return from Africa which is 
one of the highest rates in the world 
(Snyder 2003). Other prevailing 
determinants of capital inflows and 
especially FDI flows into sub-
64 
     Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs (CUJPIA) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), June, 2013 
 
Saharan Africa have been eclectic, 
localisation determinants while push 
factors have remained constant over 
the years. The importance of FDI is 
underscored by the ultimate net 
value additions to the entrepreneurial 
ability of the domestic investors 
(Kumar and Pradhan, 2002). FDIs 
mainly come through Multinational 
Corporations which seek and obtain 
various advantages before investing. 
The more profitable inflows of FDIs 
have been through greenfields rather 
than through mergers and 
acquisitions, while brownfields have 
not been so common. 
 
Ahlquist (2006) discusses the role of 
stability of governmental policies on 
flows of direct and portfolio types. 
While portfolio investors react to 
fiscal policy outcomes, changes in 
the policies by reallocating their 
invested capital, direct investors 
react to changes in political 
institutions due to their more stable 
nature. The more stable the policies 
governing the institutions are, the 
more stable the direct investment. 
The Lucas (1990) paradox becomes 
real in the African situations where 
the MNCs are expected to lead in 
investment now lag and sudden 
changes in the environments induce 
further capital retrenchment or flow 
reversals. Though answers were less 
plausible at the time, other solutions 
seem to have emerged as a result of 
the somersault type of policies that 
African governments plunge their 
economies into. 
 
Over the years the traditional 
determinants of FDIs have changed 
somewhat with globalisation leading 
the changes (Kokko, 2002). Also 
issues such as democratisation of the 
governance and polity have been key 
(Addison and Heshmati 2003).  
Ajayi (2007) reasons that the choice 
of a particular domestic environment 
to locate facilities is informed by 
whether the MNC is market and 
resource seeking (for example 
Nigeria) for its outputs or seeking 
cost reduction or efficiency in 
production to export (for example 
the Export Processing Zones). 
Undoubtedly, portfolio flows have 
less stability and therefore less 
reliability and less sought after than 
FDI which tends to be more reliable. 
Irrespective of policies of the 
governments in place, (military or 
civilian) the environments, (industry 
and business) do matter. The 
environments dictate the cost and 
pricing structure of the eventual 
products of the foreign investor - the 
MNC. 
 
Military incursions in the politics of 
African countries have many root 
causes ranging from acute 
contestation of political power to 
mismanagement of the economy. 
More importantly the military have 
blamed civilian governments for 
economic mismanagement and 
corruption and have cited this as the 
reason for their incursion to power. It 
is clear from literature that the 
military is not respected in the 
international financial and economic 
community due to their lack of 
legitimacy and more importantly 
possibility of lack of respect for 
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agreements. Military governments 
are more likely to foist restrictive 
regulatory regimes on the country 
leading to reversals of earlier gains 
of deregulation and liberalisation. 
Nevertheless the interest in the 
exploitation of resources from Africa 
either by the foreign powers or by 
the Multi National Corporations 
MNCs has continued unabated 
(Barnes, 2004). Coups and 
countercoups were rife with no 
accountability; factionalism occurred 
but with support of foreign powers 
while authoritarianism and high level 
of corruption existed. Military 
governments have tended to weaken 
economic performance with their 
focus on extractive industries 
basically for the purpose of 
exploitation of resources and 
undermine the institutions that 
encourage the entrenchment of 
democratic values. 
 
Resurgence of Military Coup 
D’états 
According to Oyediran (1989), there 
are three dominant positions in the 
literature on military rule in Africa. 
Some see the military as the best 
organised institution and a reliable 
manager of social change in 
developing countries. This is hinged 
on the fact that the military 
institution is highly disciplined, as 
such having the capacity to 
guarantee the necessary stability for 
economic development (Guteridge 
1982, Horowitz 1966 Pye 1960). 
Others believe that development and 
reform can only be brought by 
revolution to which only the regular 
constitute the principal obstacle to 
such process of change in developing 
countries. This is because the 
military institution is naturally 
conservative and oligarchic and 
always allies the middle who tries to 
uphold the status quo which is in 
their class advantage (Nun 1957). 
The last perspective views the 
military as incapable of making real 
efforts towards building lasting 
political institution. It sees the 
military as conservative and 
unproductive (Huntington 1969). 
 
The 1960s were once called the “the 
military decade in Africa,” given that 
the continent was plagued by coups 
during this period (Zoiberg 1973). In 
West Africa, Togo, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone 
and Mali all experienced one or more 
successful coups between 1960 and 
1970 alone.(McGowan 2006) In the 
1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of 
African leaders were assassinated or 
forced from office by coups d‟état. 
Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, only five countries in Africa 
held competitive elections on a 
regular basis.(Greenblatt 2012). The 
dynamics was changed following the 
third wave democratic wind that 
swept most of these regimes away 
and ushering in regimes that could 
lay claim to power through multi-
party electoral processes. These 
changes witnessed at the national 
political levels also played out in 
international relations. Apart from 
development partners insisting that 
African countries must democratize 
to have access to funds, regional 
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institutions such as the Economic 
Community of West African States 
ECOWAS and the African Union 
AU has enshrined it in their protocol 
and charter that only democratically 
elected officials would be allowed to 
have dealings with the institutions 
respectively. 
 
The shared combination of these 
factors is enough to push almost all 
the countries in the continent 
towards the path of democracy and 
openness. However the nature of 
these societies particularly countries 
of the west African sub-region and 
the structure of the political economy 
makes the foundation of these 
democracies shaky with constant 
threat of collapsing or not holding 
up. Some of these countries have 
been able to endure great elastic push 
which others such as Mali, Niger, 
Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome/ 
Principe were not able to withstand. 
In these counties the intervention of 
the military can no longer be said to 
be corrective as the military 
institution has been fingered as the 
problem for most of them but the 
trail of these scenario is uncertainty 
and instability that is detrimental to 
the economic wellbeing of these 
countries. 
The question we should attempt to 
answer here is why does the military 
institution abandon its traditional 
role for the society and dive into 
direct participation and control of 
state apparatus? So many factors 
have been advanced as responsible 
for this development. 
The first point here is the complex 
relationship that exists between the 
civil authority and the military, the 
problem of civil-military relations. 
Some scholars such as Wintrobe 
(1988), Wintrobe (1990) and 
Mcguire, Olson (1996).and Besley 
and Robinson (2009) has analyze the 
opposition between civil government 
(democratic or non-democratic) and 
military dictatorship. Acemoglu et al. 
(2010) on his part attempted to 
categorize dictatorial regime types 
into three viz; non-democratic civil 
government, military dictatorship 
and democratic civil government. 
The study identifies the army as 
agent of the powerful elite which 
uses it as an instrument to guarantee 
its survival through repression of 
decent. The uneven income 
distribution in these societies and the 
relevance of the army becomes 
stronger, especially in a contest 
where the political competition takes 
shape between polarized groups, 
fighting to obtain power and rents. 
The origin of these groups develops 
along different cleavages, such as 
ethnic or regional origins, religion, 
ownership of the production factors 
and so on. The clash between these 
polarized and fragmented groups 
determines winners and losers, 
involved in violent fighting to gain 
the control of the State (Hammond 
and Axelrod, 2006; Montalvo and 
Reynal Querol, 2007; Alesina et al., 
2003 and Fearon, 2004). It is this 
kind of social situation with different 
groups fighting for power that raises 
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the opportunity for civil war and 
coup d‟état.   
The continent of Africa is 
characterized by a high degree of 
unconsolidated democracy, hybrid 
democracy, civil autocracy and 
military dictatorship in spite of third 
wave democratization that blew 
across the continent. For example, 
authoritarian systems are based on a 
nonexistent political pluralism where 
power is shared between some 
organizations that guarantee support 
and security to the regime. Under 
military dictatorship the army has the 
most important role on stage, its 
power is less checked which a times 
produces kleptocratic regimes 
(Acemoglu e al., 2003), where the 
dictator can grab a lot of resources 
and guarantee his survival through 
the divide-et-impera. This scenario 
makes it possible for elite 
contestation for the control of the 
State. This occurs when new group 
emerges, thus giving rise to new 
elites that want to handle the rents 
and revenues (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006). In the case of the 
developing countries – where 
productive sectors like 
manufacturing, productive 
agriculture, utilities, services and 
others are very weak, this process 
has the goal to obtain central power, 
with the wealth given by oil, 
diamond or other resources.  Here 
contestation for control is hinged on 
three basic aspects regarding the 
production factors: appropriation, 
division and production. This 
ultimately, drives differences in the 
opportunity to enjoy the public 
goods between losers and winners, 
through different enforcement of the 
property rights and contracts 
(Tangerås and Lagerlöf, 2008; 
Gonzales, 2005, 2010; Dal Bò and 
Powell, 2007). 
Bolhken (2009), has noted that the 
risk of a coup d‟état could be a 
strong deterrent to uncontrollable 
episodes of rent-seeking, corruption 
and extra-budget funds than the 
electoral process in democracies. 
The blend between the democratic 
checks and military risk reduces the 
commandeering of the state wealth. 
This is the same dynamics that 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use 
to explain the transformation of the 
political system: 1) a situation 
without violence, because there is 
redistribution between the groups, 
driving to cooperation. Here income 
inequality would be very low, so that 
the elite does not fell threat from the 
extending of the redistribution; 2) to 
respond to the violence caused from 
no fairness in the redistribution, the 
ruling elite could draft in the most 
productive and dangerous groups, 
sharing with them the wealth and the 
rents of the country. In this situation, 
income inequality is higher than 
before, and this threatens the 
conservative elite; 3) the elite does 
not want to share the rents with other 
groups, therefore causing 
competition and violence. Just like 
before, income inequality is very 
high. Hence, it is possible to say that 
higher income inequality could raise 
the probability of a civil war and, 
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consequently, request a larger army 
for the repression. But, at least, this 
could increase the opportunity for 
coup d‟état. In this contest, both 
Besley and Robinson (2009) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) see the army 
like guardian of the elite, as an agent 
that acts to defend it from the risk of 
civil war. The central government 
will choose the size of the army, but 
it faces an agency problem: the army 
may not only be the instrument to 
defend the elite, but may seize the 
power. If the government increases 
the size of the army to respond to a 
higher risk from the loser groups, 
this increases the opportunity for a 
coup d‟état, but diminishes its 
opportunity cost. 
 
In Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) 
and Besley and Robinson (2009) 
state capacity, the quality of 
institution and the problem of 
violence are analyzed.  State capacity 
here is the quality of the legal and 
fiscal capability of the central power. 
The low level of these two aspects 
raises income inequality, uneven 
distribution of public goods and bad 
use of wealth, creating tensions and 
grievances in the society. When 
property rights and contracts are not 
properly enforced (low legal 
capacity) and the level of taxation is 
collected from a source that is not 
under the complete control of the 
government - like natural resources - 
(low fiscal capacity) the distribution 
of the public goods between the 
different groups is highly uneven, 
thus raising the risk of civil unrest. 
To maintain their economic, social 
and cultural insulation, the elite have 
to establish an efficient monopoly of 
violence. The loser groups that are 
not protected by right and contract, 
and that could not check the use of 
taxation and state rents, presenting 
unequal and low income, have the 
opportunity to use the civil war to 
gain the central power. So, the 
government has to create an army in 
order to counter this threat. 
However, the establishment of a 
bigger army may turn to be 
dangerous, because the military can 
actually exploit the use of force. In 
such a case, a classical principal-
agent problem would take shape. 
Persson and Robinson (2009) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2010),has pointed 
out that the military could act no 
more like agent of the government, 
but in their own interest. This 
happens when the military believes 
that they are not paid a „fair wage‟, 
they could behave as more like self-
interested agent than agent of the 
central government. 
 
In sum, this increases the probability 
of a coup d‟état.  Acemoglu et al. 
(2010) identify three different 
patterns to underline this: 1) the civil 
government could decide not to use 
the repression and hence establishes 
a little army, favouring the 
cooperation and a smooth transition 
to democracy. The new democratic 
government faces a big problem: in 
order to consolidate democracy it is 
necessary to reform the army, but 
they do not want to be reformed. In 
this instance it becomes possible to 
find a commitment problem, because 
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the government has to promise to the 
military that it will not reform it – 
otherwise they will block the 
transitional process - but to permit 
the consolidation of the democracy 
this reform is necessary; 2) the civil 
government may want to use 
repression against social opposition. 
They create a big army but they have 
to pay a right price (wage and public 
goods) that avoid the recourse to 
coup d‟état. The non-democratic 
government remains in office and the 
coup d‟état does not happen; 3) The 
government uses the army to avoid 
the opposition take over of power, so 
they create a big army but they are 
unable, or do not want, to pay the 
right price for their services. 
Ultimately the army takes the power 
establishing a military dictatorship. 
The same dynamics could be 
extrapolated from Besley and 
Robinson (2009): the civil 
government needs the help of the 
army, through the repression, to 
block the social opposition and the 
risk of civil war, but has to pay the 
right price for this action and 
protection. If this does not happen, 
the military seize the power putting 
down the previous government. This 
vicious cycle characterizes both 
models, helping to explain the 
relationship between the 
redistribution of public goods, civil 
war and coup d‟état. 
 
La Porta et al (1999) in their study 
has shown that there is growing 
evidence that a low level of 
institutional quality is a fundamental 
source of waste of the wealth. It also 
determines an uneven distribution of 
public goods between different 
groups. As such, a low institutional 
quality stimulates the grievances of 
the loser groups, boosting their 
willingness to use violence and 
increasing the probability that a civil 
war takes shapes. This makes it more 
likely that central elite/government 
resort to repression by the army, 
creating a larger one, raising the 
likelihood of a military dictatorship. 
In general, provision of public goods 
differs dramatically between 
democracies and dictatorships. 
Democracies exceed dictatorial 
provision (Deacon, 2009). 
 
Needless to say, there is predictable 
linkage between the availability of 
natural resources and such kind of 
argument. The rents emerging from 
controlling the mining sector 
increase the likelihood of an actual 
conflict between the ruling group 
and the military or another 
competing group. In other words, the 
existence of natural resources 
contribute to the insulation of the 
elite in charge, by reducing the 
capacity of enforcing property rights 
and contracts, thus raising the risk 
that the loser groups use violence 
and civil war to depose the 
government. Consequently, natural 
resources increase the probability in 
the use of repression through the 
army, and, eventually the likelihood 
of a military dictatorship. 
 
External Determinants of Coups 
D’état 
External factors can also affect the 
probability of a coup d‟état: if a 
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country has some neighbours 
experiencing ethnic wars and 
violence, and inside its borders it 
reproduces the same cleavages, it 
could be influenced by this 
circumstance, reproducing these 
problems. That is, a contagion effect 
may exist. However, Besley and 
Robinson (2009) and Acemoglu et al 
(2010) emphasize that if a country 
perceives a serious threat of a war 
between two states, this would 
reduce the risk of a coup d‟état 
because the army is now necessary 
for the survival of both the 
government and the state. Therefore, 
the politicians (democratic or non-
democratic) have to pay the right 
wage to soldiers, solving the 
commitment problem that we have 
analyzed before. A credible threat on 
the borders can reduce the coup's 
risk. De Groot (2011) emphasizes the 
role of external influences in 
determining political freedom in 
Africa. He finds that the probability 
of an improvement in political 
freedoms increases with a history of 
political freedom, openness, and 
improvements in ethno linguistically 
similar neighbouring countries. 
 
Coups d‟état in Africa have received 
some attention in the literature by 
sociologists and political scientists. 
For instance Jackman (1978) 
estimates a model of the structural 
determinants of coups d'état for the 
newly emerged states of Sub-
Saharan Africa in the years from 
1960 through 1975.  The results from 
that study indicate that social 
mobilization and the presence of a 
dominant ethnic group are 
destabilizing; a multiparty system is 
destabilizing (especially when a 
dominant ethnic group exists) while 
electoral turnout in the last election 
before independence is stabilizing. 
Johnson et al. (1984) replicate the 
previous work concentrating on 
military coups, finding serious 
weaknesses in the original Jackman 
model. The dataset in this study 
includes 35 Sub-Saharan African 
states from 1960 through 1982. They 
find that states with relatively 
dynamic economies and whose 
societies were not very socially 
mobilized before independence and 
which have maintained or restored 
some degree of political participation 
and political pluralism have 
experienced fewer military coups, 
attempted coups, and coup plots than 
have states with the opposite set of 
characteristics. Jenkins and Kposowa 
(1990), using data on military coups 
in 33 Sub-Saharan African states 
between 1957 and 1984, discovered 
strong support for modernization and 
competition theories of ethnic 
antagonisms, military centrality 
theory and aspects of dependency 
theory. Political development theory 
is not supported. Ethnic diversity and 
competition, military centrality, debt 
dependence, and political 
factionalism are major predictors of 
coup de tat. 
 
It was also discovered that ethnic 
dominance is a stabilizing force that 
create social integration and 
weakening opposition. Intractable 
conflicts rooted in ethnic competition 
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and economic dependence appears to 
create a structural context for 
military coups and related 
instabilities. O'Kane (1993) argues 
that the underlying causes of coups 
are specialization in and dependency 
on primary goods for export, 
exacerbated by poverty. A testable 
hypothesis is deduced from this 
theory which is examined through 
the application of discriminant 
analysis to data for three sets of 
African countries. The models 
support the theory. Moreover, the 
chance of a successful coup is 
negatively related with the absence 
of a previous coup and the 
continuing or historic presence of 
foreign troops since independence. 
Tusalem (2010) finds that over the 
1970-1990 periods the likelihood of 
a military coup is reduced by the 
protection of property rights. 
 
Lunde (1991) studies African coups 
d‟état during the period from 1955 to 
1985. The starting point is a 
replication of Jackman (1978) when 
continuous-time hazard models of 
event history data are used instead of 
the panel regression approach. The 
event history approach focuses on 
the rate of coup d'etats over time 
rather than some index of coup 
d'etat. The results lend some support 
to modernization theory. The social 
contagion hypothesis and the history 
of political instability are also 
supported. Finally, the results 
indicate that the likelihood of a coup 
strongly depends on time. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) in a 
panel of African countries from 1960 
to 2001 highlight strong similarity in 
the causes of coups and civil wars, 
finding that low income and lack of 
growth are among the main 
determinants. Both are also subject 
to „traps‟ – once a coup or civil war 
has occurred, further events are 
much more likely. Finally, policies 
that favour the military (high 
military expenditure) may increase 
the risk of a coup. These have been 
the bane of Africa prior to the third 
wave democratic wind that blew 
across the continent. But even when 
some has begun to place regime 
change via coup de tat as a relic, 
resurgence is rearing up again in part 
of the continent. Ogude (2012) posits 
that this resurgence of military rule 
in parts of Africa especially West 
African sub-region can be attributed 
to many factors, which are not very 
different from those factors that 
pushed the military into politics in 
the years of post-independence. 
Specifically he identified the non 
entrenchment of democracy in some 
African countries, the quest by 
incumbents to subvert the democratic 
processes in other to hang on to 
power, the lack of socio-economic 
development in these countries 
which stokes instability, creating the 
condition for coup de tat. In that 
same study Ogude (2012) also 
identified destructive civil-military 
relation resulting in fight for power 
as explanatory variables for the 
resurgence of the military rule in 
West African sub-region.  
 
Return to Military Government 
and Analytical Framework 
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Transitions to democracy became a 
fad for many countries of sub-
Saharan Africa as from1990s (Fosu, 
2008). Some happened through 
blood and violence while others were 
negotiated. Iys were expected to felt 
in many areas and especially on the 
well being and development of the 
respective countries. Acemoglu, 
(2009) and Rodrik 2005 have 
reported positive impacts with 
expectation of strong institutions that 
eliminates some evils still in place; 
have not been entirely beneficial. 
The main impact of democratisation 
has been on the seeming progress 
towards a market based economy 
(Sorensen 2010)  General 
conclusions have been negative on 
the immediate impact of 
democratisation as Sarky (2012) 
indicates  the total impact of 
democracy has been the bane of 
income in sub-Saharan Africa. 
dominant West African countries 
have lost some ground in the FDI 
flows in the recent past due to 
changes in the domestic  
environments in the oil industry and 
nascent entry of Ghana which is not 
sufficient to replace the reduction 
being suffered by Nigeria 
(UNCTAD, 2011) in the face of 
current internal securities challenges 
posed by the a supposedly religious 
sect. Worse still, the two countries 
have also lost the civilian 
governance to military which is 
expected to impact negatively 
against their financial interrelation 
with external world. 
 
The West African sub-region has 
always been a mixed bag. During the 
colonial era the region produced a 
mixture of intense nationalist 
struggle that took the form of 
warfare and extreme repression as is 
the case with Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde to relatively easier 
struggles that centres on debate and 
superior arguments as is the case 
with Nigeria and Ghana. It is also 
within this region that the waves of 
military intervention in politics in the 
1960s played out, while some states 
such as Senegal and Ivory Coast 
remained stable under civilian one 
regime that were not necessarily 
democratic. The region has also had 
its own shares of internal upheavals 
and wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and even Nigeria as well as an arena 
where the headwind of democratic 
third wave where a national 
sovereign conference turned around 
the dynamics in Benin and Mali. 
That trend almost spread across sub-
Saharan Africa, but where it was 
most pronounced was the West 
African sub-region where almost all 
the countries of the continent 
embraced some form of democracy. 
This even went to the extent where it 
was stipulated in the ECOWAS 
protocol that only democratic change 
of government can be acceptable and 
recognised. 
 
Though Acemoglu et al. (2010) and 
Besley and Robinson (2010)) 
analyses that the relationship 
between the civil government in 
Africa and the military as an agency 
problem in the sense that the civilian 
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government needs the army to avoid 
internal violence, but a larger army 
reduces the opportunity-cost for the 
military to run a coup d‟état and 
seize power. The resurgence of 
military coup de tat in West Africa 
particularly required closer look to 
establish whether the main causes of 
military revolve around income 
inequality, ethnic fractionalization, 
and external threat that seem to drive 
coups previously in the region. 
 
The first sign came in the early hours 
of 22 March 2012, with news of a 
military coup d‟état in Mali. The 
coup leaders claimed a lack of 
adequate means and resources to 
fight Tuareg insurgents in the north 
of the country as the main reason for 
their action. That announcement by 
on state television by the coup 
leaders effectively puts an end to the 
administration of Amadou Toumani 
Toure as president of Mali. Barely 
three weeks later, on 12 April 2012, 
the government of Guinea Bissau 
was toppled by elements of the 
country‟s military after alleged plans 
by the former to downsize the 
military. Interestingly, both coups 
occurred only a couple of weeks 
prior to scheduled presidential 
elections. In Mali, outgoing 
President Toure had made clear his 
intention to hand over power to a 
democratically elected president 
after the 29 April 2012 elections. In 
Guinea-Bissau, a second round of 
presidential elections was also 
scheduled for 29 April 2012, 
although the leading opposition 
candidate had opted to boycott the 
polls, claiming fraud in the first 
round. Although accession to power 
through elections has become the 
norm in Africa, the two recent coups 
d‟état in West Africa have 
underscored lingering deficiencies in 
Africa‟s contested electoral 
democracies and their influence on 
the reoccurrence of coups, 
particularly in the West African sub-
region (Ogude, 2012). 
 
Niger 
The kind of civilian rule perpetuated 
by President Mamadou Tandja of 
Niger and its potential catastrophic 
consequences has a lot to do with the 
success the coupists in Niger 
recorded. This explains why the 
recent development in Niger did not 
arouse bitter resentment against the 
Junta by the Nigerien populace. The 
regional grouping, the Economic 
Community for West African States 
(ECOWAS) realizing this, did not 
out rightly condemn the coup, but 
urged the coup leaders to act quickly 
to restore civilian rule. The cynicism 
towards civilian governments and 
elections are being discredited by the 
actors within the democratic process 
which creates the opening for 
changes by other means. The 
contempt towards corrupt civilian 
governments is widely shared and 
Africans seem to have concluded 
that these governments that have 
upped expectations, fail to deliver 
and when the electorate appears 
helpless to hold them accountable, 
option from the military seem a 
welcome trend as indications show 
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from the recent military resurgence 
in the sub-region. 
 
Tandja used democracy to wage war 
against the media, the civil society 
and political parties. He hastily 
drafted a constitution that did not 
benefit from input from either civil 
society or the general public. He 
simply extended his term by 3 years, 
apparently without election, and 
allowed for an unlimited number of 
presidential terms. And yet there 
cannot be a democracy without a 
civil society; none without a media, 
and is almost unthinkable without 
vibrant opposition political parties, 
as there is no democracy without the 
state.  Civilian governments without 
democratic soul or substance are 
sources of despair and instability, 
and no good can come out of them. 
At the same time there is less will 
and no international mechanism to 
enforce democratic elections. While 
banning taking force by force, we 
failed to come up with alternative 
sources of effecting political change.  
 
Mali 
Mali has clearly been portrayed as 
the poster-child of good democratic 
transition in West Africa following 
the democratic third wave that blew 
across the world. But this good 
report was shattered on Wednesday 
March 23th, 2012 when its president, 
Amadou Toumani Touré, was 
toppled by a military junta, thereby 
setting the clock backwards for the 
country that seemingly had made a 
progress on the path of democracy.  
What is ironic about the Malian coup 
was that it happened less than one 
month before the next presidential 
election. The big question that bugs 
the mind is to examine the reason 
behind a resurgence of the military in 
a country seen to have made a 
progress on democracy for over a 
decade witnessing transition from 
one administration to another in a 
democratic order (Ndonga, 2008). 
 
The answer cannot be farfetched 
from the fall-out of the conflict in 
Mali involving the Tuareg minority 
in the North, the latest round of 
which has been simmering since the 
coup occurred, had been proving 
unexpectedly difficult for 
government forces to quash. It is 
obvious inability of the government 
in Bamako to act decisively over the 
Tuareg rebellion, that triggered a 
cabal of soldiers, and led by junior 
officers, to express their disaffection 
by seizing the Presidential palace 
and State TV station (Nossiter, 
2012). 
 
Seizure of the Palace therefore is 
sure part of a string of protests over 
the way the Malian government has 
failed to handle the Tuareg rebellion. 
The Tuareg National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
has been fighting for a separate state 
(its population is spread across the 
borders into neighbouring Algeria 
and Niger), and the army have felt 
increasingly on the back-foot, 
accusing the Toure government of 
failing to provide them with 
sufficient arms and support to defeat 
the insurgency. The mutiny-turned-
coup ignited as the Defence Minister, 
General Sadio Gassama, visited a 
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military base in the town of Kati, 
approximately 13 miles from the 
capital, on the said Wednesday 
morning that the coup took place. As 
the General departed, protestors 
began stoning his car and by the 
afternoon had seized control of the 
television station in the Bamako, 
before taking the Palace in the 
evening. 
 
The Army‟s disquiet is also reflected 
by military families and the wider 
populace, particularly in the south of 
the country, who are unhappy at 
reports of heavy losses the army is 
suffering. February saw thousands of 
citizens take to the streets in protest 
over the way in which the 
government had been handling the 
uprising. Yet, that a coup should 
have occurred so close to the April 
29th elections, when Touré was due 
to step down, is highly significant. It 
has been suggested that the seizure 
of power in this way is indicative of 
a sentiment among sections of the 
military, and their supporters in 
civilian society, who believe that 
politicians are unable to competently 













Depletion Rate of FDI Stocks for the Countries 
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Source: From Authors Calculations  
 
The coup had indeed, interrupted of 
Mali‟s democracy and jeopardised its 
status as bedrock of democracy in 
West Africa. Not having the right 
weapons to kill their fellow 
countrymen may be one, catalytic, 
cause for the coup; just as likely, 
however, is the proximate 
explanation which has seen Touré 
divide and exploit internal 
relationships within Tuareg society, 
protracting violence to the point 
where the Army feel incapable of 
winning. Even though programmes 
for peace and reconciliation, 
promised by the president following 
previous rebellions, have failed to 
get off of the ground – although 
many Tuareg were previously 
integrated into the Malian Army, 
some do not see the Tuareg as 
Malian citizens. Inspired in part by 
the diversion caused by the military 
coup, Tuareg rebels in the north 
launched incursions deeper into 
Mali, seizing towns and bases 
formerly held by government forces 
fighting the conflict that caused the 
coup (Lewis, and 2012). As military 
forces have been engaged in 
consolidating their hold on the 
capital, the rebels have been able to 
push southward with little 
opposition. The distraction of the 
government troops provided avenue 
for the MNLA to make advances and 
consolidate their hold in the north of 
Mali. Their new found strength also 
attributed to the Arab Spring 
especially the fall of Ghadafi whose 
renegades ran to Mali and West 
Africa with lots of arms that has now 
got into the hands of the rebels. The 
capture of strategic towns in northern 
Mali by the MNLA including the 
ancient city of Tinbuktu, Gao and 
douzenta prompted the separatists 
group announce an end to the 
rebellion and declaring an Islamic 
republic of Azwad (Dioura and 
Diarra 2012) . 
 
Though the events in northern Mali 
complicated issue, the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the International 
community stance on the coup in 
Mali was enough to force the 
coupists to recede even though 
president Traore was not restored 
back to government. A compromise 
was brokered in which an Interim 
government headed by Cheick 
Modibo Diarra to organise an 
election to restore democracy but the 
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issue of MNLA and northern Mali is 
posing a serious challenge to that 
that has seen the intervention of 
United Nations and African Union 
planning to launch an attack on Mali 




The situation in Guinea Bissau prior 
to April 12th , 2012 when some 
elements in the military succeeded in 
toppling the democratic government 
of Carlos Gomes Junior, we had 
witnessed instability sparked by 
attempts to topple the government on 
previous occasion. The military 
unrest of 2010 and a failed coup 
attempt in 2011 as a result of 
infighting between the Navy and the 
Army and the free flow of drugs 
from Europe and Latin America 
which has made the country a 
narcostate. The death of Malam 
Bacai Sanha on January 9th, 2012 
led to preparation for a new election 
which was scheduled to be held 
within 90 days in accordance with 
the Guinea Bissau constitution. 
Despite a peaceful campaign, there 
were fears of possible violence or a 
coup d'état if the army which is 
obviously not ethnically balanced did 
not approve of the winner 
(Zounmenou, 2009).  
 
But the crux of the matter was the 
decision of Angola to withdraw its 
forces from the two-year old 
MISSANG mission to modernise the 
Guinea Bissau military. The Guinea 
Bissau military struck following the 
visit of Guinea-Bissau Defense 
Minister Jorge Tolentino Araujo to 
Angola for a meeting with his 
counterpart Cândido Pereira dos 
Santos Van-Dunem and the Army 
Chief-of-Staff Geraldo Sachipengo 
Nunda on the 16th of April 2012. He 
was also expected to visit the Higher 
Warfare School (ESG) and the 
Higher Technical Military Institute 
(ISTM).  All these coupled with 
unpopularity of Carlos Gomes Junior 
with the army for his attempts to 
reform the institution where 
significant explanation for the coup. 
For instance, there was a report by 
SIC Noticias of Portugal a day 
before the coup where an 
unidentified military commander  
claimed that Carlos Gomes Júnior 
would allow Angolan troops into the 
country citing a  "secret document" 
in the possession of the soldiers to 
justify his claim that Guinea-Bissau 
government is about to sanction an 
Angolan attack on Guinea-Bissau's 
military.  After they struck, the 
leaders of the coup released an 
unsigned communiqué that read they 
"did not have ambitions of power," 
the coup was a reaction to the 
alleged agreement with Angola that 
involved 200 military trainers 
because it would "annihilate Guinea-
Bissau's armed forces.  
 
The Guinea-Bissau coup d‟etat was 
staged by elements of the armed 
forces about two weeks before the 
second round of a presidential 
election between Carlos Gomes 
Junior and Mohamed lala Embalo. 
Both candidates and the president 
were initially arrested by the junta. 
Members of the Military Council, 
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which ran the country until an 
interim National Transitional 
Council was established on April 
15th 2012, said that one of the 
reasons for the coup was the 
incumbent civilian administration's 
call for support from Angola to 
reform the military. Following 
international condemnation and 
sanctions against leaders of the junta, 
an agreement was signed that led to 
the third placed candidate in the 
election, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, 
becoming the interim president. 
 
Conclusion 
There are, at least, three sources of 
military interventions in what could 
be considered as the new generation 
of coups in Africa. The first is the 
indignation of the Generals. The 
second is the rage of the ranks. The 
third is when the state allows its own 
overthrow. There are cases when the 
civilians invited the military to take 
power. Probably a fourth aspect in 
the new generation of coups in 
Africa is what could be referred to as 
the French factor. Almost all recent 
coups took place in Francophone 
countries. Is it a Francophone 
phenomenon? If so, is it related to 
the way the French governed, and 
left, and returned? Or is it a 
coincidence?  
 
The recent of coups in West African 
sub-region is not an anomaly and 
only epitomizes the current political 
ills, something like a quandary, in 
the African continent and should be 
treated as such. The resurgence of 
unconstitutional changes of 
government in Africa is a reflection 
of this deeper problem. What is 
common with these recent coups is 
that issues of spill over from election 
dispute is constant in all the cases as 
spark for the intervention of the 
military which shows that democracy 
in the continent is still fledgling. The 
second point is the issue of public 
service is yet to sink into the minds 
of people who seek power in Africa 
which is reflecting in the 
misgovernance that is cited by 
military juntas as excuse for 
upsetting the constitutional order. 
 
There is always enough reason to 
oppose any form of the involvement 
of the military in politics as a system. 
But such a system can only work if 
civilians behave differently. Banning 
the military alone will not solve 
Africa‟s governance deficit. No one 
should expect the military to behave 
otherwise, while the civilian 
governments continue to act 
illegally, contemptuously and 
brutally. For it is a mistake to 
suppose that everything civilian or 
an elected government alone will 
save us from conflict and from the 
abuses of power to which it 
inevitably leads? Africans have 
forgotten a little too quickly that for 
the African army to be tamed, the 
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